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Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings*
Ernest Gellhomt
The purpose of allowing parties to intervene in a legal action, as
the Supreme Court explained long ago in connection with a private
two-party suit, is to prevent a "failure of justice."' It is not surprising,
then, that in a time when government agencies are challenged as being
unresponsive to public needs and to the public interest, one "solution"
frequently suggested is to broaden citizen involvement and participa-
tion in administrative decision making.2 Reflecting this concern,
courts more frequently require agencies "to cut the squarest of pro-
cedural comers," ruling, for example, that all interested persons
must be allowed an "unrestricted" opportunity to be heard.3 One
consequence of this trend is that citizen groups and individuals
without a significant personal or economic stake in the outcome are
allowed to intervene as full scale "public" parties in administrative
* This article draws heavily from studies prepared by the staff of the Administrative
Conference of the United States (by Margaret Gilhooley and James H. Johnston), speeches
and testimony of Chairman Roger C. Cramton, and memoranda prepared by the staff
(by Barry B. Boyer and Richard K. Berg, the Research Director). These materials were
careful, thoughtful and imaginative. A succinct analysis of many of the questions dis-
cussed here was presented by Mr. Cramton. in an article entitled, The Why, Where and
How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525
(1972). Despite the length of these "credits," the final responsibility for this article, of
course, necessarily rests with me.
This article is based upon a report prepared for the Committee on Agency Organiza-
tion and Procedure of the Administrative Conference; the recommendation adopted by
the Conference is reprinted at the end of Mr. Cramton's article supra.
t Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A. 1956, LL.B. 1962, University of
Minnesota.
1. Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 US. 276, 285 (1884).
2. Cf. Cahn & Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARv. L. R-y. 929 (196).
S. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); id., 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (reversing FCC decision on
remand). The court held, inter alia, that merely allowing listeners to file statements or
appear as witnesses was not sufficient. Full protection of the interests they represent
requires, the court held, participation as parties and a formal hearing. An "unrestricted"
opportunity to be heard here refers to the familiar tactic of agencies seeklng to dispose
of interveners by allowing them to submit their views as witnesses or in writing; Church
of Christ I and other decisions, however, reject such "restricted" Sltematives and have
held that participation as parties without limitation may be required.
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hearings. 4 Such intervention is allowed for the purpose of presenting
"public" views not otherwise adequately represented in the pro-
ceedings.
The size of the group's constituency is not generally significant,
except at the narrowest range,5 though the "public interest" tag under
which individuals and groups are allowed to participate at agency
hearings is often misunderstood.0 The agency or its staff, it is com-
monly asserted, has the statutory obligation and does in fact represent
the public interest; it is argued that it runs contrary to common sense
and to democratic government to suggest that private groups can
arrogate that status and power to themselves. The "public interest,"
however, is not a monolith.7 It involves a balance of many interests,
and the presentation of otherwise unrepresented views should be
viewed as a potential aid rather than a hindrance to agency operations.
In their appearances before administrative agencies, nongovern-
mental public interest groups have asserted a variety of interests. Con-
servationists have pressed environmental interests in selected power
plant licensing cases before the FPC and AEC.8 Minority groups and
environmentalists have presented their objections in DOT hearings
on highway planning and location.9 Listener groups and individuals
4. For example, a "public interest group" representing environmental interests of tihe
community before an administrative proceeding may include all persons conccrned withthe protection of the environment; but at the point where the group involves only the
environmental interests of adjoining landowners, its private stake is more significant
and the group comes within the usual definition of interested persons entitled to beheard because of the impact of the agency's decision on the interests of landowners.
5. For our purposes, there is no need to demarcate precisely between public interest
and private representation. It is sufficient to note that agencies recognize public interest
groups as a distinct category, and that procedural consequences follow from this desig-
nation.
6. In fact, these groups now frequently use the more neutral phrase, "citizen groups,"but this self-styled moniker has not caught on. At one time I flirted with the ide, of
attaching the acronym "PIG" to "public interest groups," particularly after the GeorgetownInstitute for Public Interest Representation adopted the title of "INSPIRE," but on
reflection I decided not to distract from the more urgent message of this article.
7. The use of the terms "public interest group" and "public participation" reflectsno judgment of the positions asserted by such groups. The public nature of the advocacy
distinguishes it from the familiar participation by private parties. It does not imply a
superior moral position. It is suggested, however, that the public interest is composed
of a number of discrete interests. In performing its advocacy function, an agency staff
often cannot give each view separate representation. Hence, the need for public interest
group participation. For a discussion of the distinctions between "public interest" as
a decisional standard in regulatory statutes and decisions, and its reference to "points
of view which do not enjoy the sponsorship of an industry or other well'organhzd
constituency," see Lazarus Onek, The Regulators and the People 57 VA. L. RE. 1039,
1077 (1971).--8. E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1905),
cert. denied sub nora. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference,
384 U.S. 941 (1966); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).9. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971),
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have sought to intervene in broadcast license renewal hearings.10 Wel-
fare rights organizations have participated in six state conformity
hearings at HEW." And consumer groups have been admitted ex-
perimentally in two FTC false advertising proceedings and have
intervened in one ICC railroad rate case.12
The threat of public intervention still far outweighs its impact in
active cases. But public groups have not confined themselves to inter-
vening in active cases. They have also urged agencies such as the FCC
and the EPA to hold hearings to discontinue licenses and permits,
and on occasion have taken judicial action to compel recalcitrant
agencies to begin hearings.1 3 Even agency inactions or refusals to act
have had to be explained because of public interest group litigation."
There are a number of potential social advantages to public par-
ticipation in administrative hearings. Public intervention can provide
agencies with another dimension useful in assuring responsive and
responsible decisions; it can serve as a safety valve allowing interested
persons and groups to express their views before policies are announced
and implemented; it can ease the enforcement of administrative pro-
grams relying upon public cooperation; and it can satisfy judicial
demands that agencies observe the highest procedural standards. If
agency hearings were to become readily available to public participa-
tion, confidence in the performance of government institutions and
in the fairness of administrative hearings might be measurably en-
hanced.
Most efforts on behalf of public intervention to date have been
focused on establishing a "right" to intervene. This battle has largely
been won, except for the question of how far the "right" extends.
The focus of attention is shifting from the courts to the agencies;
the disputed issues now involve the contours of the procedural rights
of public interveners and the amount of assistance, if any, which
should be provided to facilitate public intervention.
This article and the resulting recommendations seek to assist agen-
cies in determining the proper role and scope of public participation
10. E.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
11. National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
12. Campbell Soup Co., 26 AD. L.2D 1011 (FTC 1970); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
27 AD. L.2D 877 (FTC 1970).
13. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hale
v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
14. E.g., Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
vacated as moot, 92 $.Ct. 577 (1972).
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in formal administrative hearings. 0 It focuses on trial-type proceed-
ings, for it is in this area that new guidelines for public intervention
most need to be established. Few, if any, controls for intervention are
needed in informal rulemaking proceedings since, as quasi-legislative
hearings, they are designed to incorporate diverse interest groups and
to serve as an outlet for community expression. After examining recent
judicial developments establishing that public interveners are welcome
participants in administrative hearings, the article will first consider
how public participation should be structured, suggesting criteria for
determining whether and when participation should be permitted or
encouraged, who should participate, and what role the participant
should play in the hearing. Ways of coping with unnecessarily high
barriers to effective public interest group participation will then be
explored.
I. The "Right" to Intervene
The recent and dramatic expansion of intervention in administrative
proceedings has built upon doctrinal developments in three distin-
guishable but related areas: the right to intervene in court adjudica-
tions; standing to seek judicial review of administrative action; and
standing to intervene in administrative adjudications.
Traditionally, the right to intervene in court adjudications was
quite narrow, depending primarily upon the existence of "property
15. The question of participation and intervention by public interest groups in ad.
ministrative hearings, of course, calls into question whether the procedures for policy
making should also be revised. Some have reviewed Scenic Hudson and concluded that
a new administrative agency with nationwide authority to plan and control the growth
of electric generating capacity is necessary. See, e.g., Kaufman, Power for the People-And
by the People: Utilities, the Environment, and the Public Interest, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 867
(1971). Others have responded that the environmental interest represented by the inter-
veners in Scenic Hudson will be protected more adequately by courts than by agencies.
See Lakeland Property Owners Ass'n v. Township of Northfield, 40 U.S.L.W. 2649 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 29, 1972); J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACTION (1971). But see Roberts v. Michigan, 2 E.R.C. 1612 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1971) (holding
unconstitutional any application to automotive pollution of a Michigan statute modeled
on Professor Sax's suggestion). These explorations need to continue. It is equally impor-
tant, however, that today's realities-of fragmented agency authority and public partici.
pation-be recognized and that public interveners be integrated into administrative agency
procedures. Not only is the public interest likely to be served in the interim, but a viable
alternative may develop from experience. This article seeks to fulfill that objective.
In addition, this article focuses on public participation in formal agency action. This
is not to say that informal action is not equally (or, often, more) significant or that
public participation in informal proceedings should be ignored. See, e.g., North City
Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 40 U.S.L. Week 2572 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 1972); K,
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). Every study has its limits-and this one is no excep-
tion. However, many of the recommendations offered here seem relevant to informal
administrative action.
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which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the
court," and requiring a showing that the intervener's interest was
inadequately protected by existing parties.10 The grounds for dem-
onstrating inadequacy of representation were sharply circumscribed.'-
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have liberal-
ized the property requirement, so that under the present rules all an
intervener need show is "an interest relating to the property or trans-
action which is the subject of the action."' s Relaxation of the repre-
sentation requirement has also occurred. In Cascade Natural Gas Corp.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., the Supreme Court held that a state, a
customer, and a competitor had a sufficient interest to intervene in
a government antitrust divestiture proceeding because their interest
was inadequately represented. 19 Though the full effect of El Paso on
criteria for intervention as of right in court trials is not yet clear,
several lower court opinions have concluded that the rules now create
a presumption in favor of the right to intervene.2 0
Liberalization of the rules governing standing to seek judicial re-
view of agency action has been slower, but no less extensive. The early
view was that a party seeking judicial scrutiny had to show that he
had a legally protected interest, rather than a mere economic stake,
that was adversely affected by the agency's decision.2' After a time,
however, the doctrinal barriers began to crumble. The first major
breakthrough was FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,2 2 where the
Supreme Court held that the statutory language granting judicial re-
view to "persons aggrieved" by FCC decisions meant that competing
licensees could seek review solely on the basis of potential economic
16. The historical development of intervention as of right is traced in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Stewart in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
386 U.S. 129, 143 (1967).
17. 3B J. MooRu, FEDERAL PRACrcE 24.09-114], at 24-316 (2d ed. 1969).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
19. 386 U.S. 129 (1967), discussed in Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervetiion Before
Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Haav. L. REv. 721, 729.31, 741-45 (1963). For an
excellent analysis of third party public participation in antitrust law enforcement. see
Buxbaum, Public Participation in the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, 59 C*,ta.
L. Rxv. 1113 (1971).
20. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc); Nucsse v. Camp,
385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But cf. SB J. MooaE, FEDERAL PRAcncE 24.09.1[4],
at 24-316 (2d ed. 1969).
21. See Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1937). For an overview
of the changing law of standing to seek judicial review of agency action, see Scanwell
Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Davis, The Liberal.
ized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970); Jaffe. Standing Again, 84 HAnv. L.
Rav. 633 (1971); Comment, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of
Standing, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 540 (1971). See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151-52 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22. 309 US. 470 (1940).
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injury. In enacting the review provision, the Court concluded, Con-
gress "may have been of the opinion that one likely to be financially
injured by the issue of a license would be the only person having a
sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors
of law in the action of the Commission .... "-2 3
The Court expanded this rationale in Scripps-Howard,'1 noting
that "these private litigants have standing only as representatives of
the public interest." Then, in FCC v. National Broadcasting Co.
(KOA), the Court added a new thought: "It would be anomalous
if one entitled to be heard before the Commission should be denied
the right of appeal from an order made without hearing."25 These
two concepts-that private litigants seeking review of administrative
action are properly viewed as vindicators of the public interest,20 and
that there is a logical nexus between the right to seek judicial review
of the administrative decision and the right to participate in the
agency's decision-making process 27-- were to prove pivotal factors in
the emerging law of public interest group intervention.
23. Id. at 477.
24. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942).
25. 319 U.S. 239, 246 (1943).
26. The logical extension of this rationale was classically stated by Judge Frank In
Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707
(1943):
While Congress can constitutionally authorize no one, in the absence of an actual
justiciable controversy, to bring a suit for the judicial determination either of the
constitutionality of a statute or the scope of powers conferred by a statute upon
government officers, it can constitutionally authorize one of its own officials such as
the Attorney General, to bring a proceeding to prevent another official from acting
in violation of his statutory powers; for then an actual controversy exists, and the
Attorney General can properly be vested with authority, in such a controversy, to
vindicate the interest of the public or the government. Instead of designating the
Attorney General, or some other public officer, to bring such proceedings, Congress
can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non.official person, or on a
designated group of non-official persons, authority to bring a suit to prevent action
by an officer in violation of his statutory powers; for then, in like manner, there is
an actual controversy, and there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress
from empowering any person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving
such a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such
persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.
See also Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 863.65 (D.C. Cir. 1970).,
27. Significant refinement of this rationale took place in National Coal Ass'n v. FI'C,
191 F.2d 462, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1951):
It is said that the Commission is authorized to permit or deny intervention at its
discretion and that, since these petitioners had no right to intervene, they call
have no right to judicial review. The Commission itself admits, however, that It
may not abuse its discretion. This, to us, means that there are some persons who
have a right to participate in Commission proceedings and some who do not. We
think it clear that any person who would be "aggrieved" by the Commission's order,
such as a competitor, is also a person who has a right to intervene. Otherwise,
judicial review, which may be had only by a party to the proceedings before the
Commission who has been "aggrieved" by its order, could be denied or unduly
forestalled by the Commission merely by denying intervention.
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The adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in
1946, providing in § 10(a) that a person "adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute"28
could obtain judicial review, also contributed to the liberalizing trend.
Its main thrust was to limit administrative power by providing a
minimum standard of review in the absence of an express review pro-
vision in particular regulatory statutes. It was also suggested, however,
that the APA did not merely codify the existing "legal interest" theory,
but expanded the availability of standing in requiring that the com-
plainant prove only that he was adversely affected in fact.20 Such a
reading would construe the Act along the lines of Sanders, allowing
anyone suffering potential economic injury to have standing to seek
judicial review, on behalf of the public interest, whenever the APA
applies.
This construction was not accepted by most courts, which concluded
instead that § 10 was merely declaratory of prior law and granted
no new rights of judicial review.30 But a number of lower courts did
rely upon § 10 to allow standing where another statute protected or
regulated some interest of the plaintiff, even though that statute did
not itself grant judicial review. 31 Under this view the APA granted
standing for the assertion of interests already recognized by Congress.
At first the Supreme Court merely refrained from discouraging this
trend. In Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., the Court held that "when
the particular statutory provision does reflect a legislative purpose to
protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has standing
to require compliance with that provision."32 It was not novel for
statutory interest to be a basis for standing, but the Court was at pains
to probe legislative history to find a primary congressional purpose
to benefit the plaintiff. Even more significant, however, was the
Court's readiness to distinguish Kansas City Power & Light Co. v.
McKay,33 where the D.C. Circuit had ruled that § 10 of the APA did
28. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
29. 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISrRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.02 (1958). The argument de-
pended upon a somewhat strained interpretation of an ambiguous legislative history
and an ungrammatical reading of the statute. See Note. Competitors' Standing to Chal-
lenge Adminstrative [sic] Action Under the APA, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 843, 856.61 (1956).
30. See, e.g., Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 931.32 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). Contra, Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d
859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
31. See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 933
n.26 (2d Cir. 1968); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 660-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
32. 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
33. 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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not confer standing; this suggested that the Court might cease to read
§ 10 so narrowly.34
By the time Hardin was decided, the first two landmark decisions
on public intervention in agency adjudication had been rendered. The
major breakthrough came in Scenic Hudson,35 where the Second
Circuit upset the FPC's rejection of evidence of alternative power
sources proffered by conservation groups and others opposing a power
plant project in a licensing proceeding. Although the specific holding
was limited to a ruling that the statutory standard of an "aggrieved
person" for purposes of judicial review was satisfied by the aesthetic,
conservation, and recreation interests of the petitioners, the court also
endorsed the "private attorney general" concept as justifying inter-
vention in the agency hearing by those without a direct personal or
economic interest in the agency decision.30
The next significant doctrinal advance came in the D.C. Circuit's
Church of Christ decision,37 where the court held that the listening
public's interest in programming content, which was characterized as
an "obvious and acute concern," was sufficient not only to seek ju-
dicial review, but also to confer standing to intervene in an FCC
adjudicatory proceeding involving a license renewal.38 Once again
there was heavy reliance on the private attorney general concept, and
on the recognition that in practice the agency staff could not always
34. In the same term, the Supreme Court also held that satisfaction of the case and
controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution-that is, a showing of such
a personal stake in the controversy as to assure "concrete adverseness"-inay be all
that is necessary to establish standing. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), a taxpayer
was allowed to challenge the constitutionality of federal financial aid to parochial
schools. Since the taxpayer also had to show a logical nexus between his status as at
taxpayer and a specific limitation on the congressional taxing and spending power in
the Constitution, it is not clear whether injury in fact is the only "constitutional"
minimum. In any case, this "minimum" approach generally has not been adopted for
determining whether the complainant has standing to seek review of agency action.
35. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
36. Id. at 615-16, 619. However, the decision stopped short of concluding that stand.
ing to seek review implied an unqualified right to participate fully in the admills,
trative proceedings: "Since the right to seek [judicial] review . . . is limited to a 'party'
to the Commission proceedings," the court reasoned, "the Commission has ample all.
thority reasonably to limit those eligible to intervene or to seek review." Id. at 617.
Moreover, the opinion left open the possibility that the Commission's obligation to
receive and consider the evidence proffered by the public interest groups arose front
the FPC's statutory mandate to undertake comprehensive planning as part of its licensing
responsibility, and that the case could therefore be distinguished on that ground. Sea
id. at 620.
37. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 991
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. The question of whether judicial and administrative standing criteria should be
the same was not litigated; instead, the court observed:
All parties seem to consider that the same standards are applicable to determining
standing before the Commission and standing to appeal a Commission order to
this court. . . . We have, therefore, used the cases dealing with standing in the
two tribunals interchangeably.
359 F.2d at 1000 n.8; see note 42 infra.
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effectively represent the listener interest. Finally, while the opinion
explicitly left to the agency discretion to promulgate regulations re-
garding public intervention, it also gave short shrift to the FCC's
contention that existing avenues of public input, such as the Com-
mission's willingness to hear citizen complaints and have complainants
appear as witnesses, were sufficient. Instead, the court simply reversed
the argument, noting that it would be no great burden for the Com-
mission to go a little bit further and permit the complainants to
become formal adjudicatory parties. 39
More recently, the Supreme Court liberalized the rules of judicial
standing in the Data Processing40 and Barlow cases, 41 which appar-
ently reduced the entire complex body of standing doctrine to two
straightforward questions: (1) Is the plaintiff "aggrieved in fact"?
(2) Is the interest sought to be protected by the plaintiff "arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question"? The D.C. Circuit was quick
to apply these tests to a question of standing to intervene in state
conformity hearings in National Welfare Rights Organization v.
Finch.4
2
39. Upon review of the remanded decision, the D.C. Circuit again reversed the FCC,
this time because the interveners had been forced to assume the burden of proof and
had otherwise been treated as "interlopers." 495 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1959). In the course
of its opinion, the court made clear that it was adopting the Scenic Hudson concept
that the agency had an affirmative duty to build a record on the issues raised by the
interveners, notwithstanding the absence of any "planning" responsibility in relevant
portions of the FCC's organic statute. See id. at 546, 548-49.
40. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970).
41. Barlow v. Collins, 597 U.S. 159 (1970).
42. 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The court also concluded that standing to obtain
judicial review implied a right to participate in administrative proceedings, since "with-
out participation in the administrative hearing, issues which appellants here might
wish to raise . . . may have been foreclosed as a topic for review.". Id. at 737.
In addition the court noted: "Cases concerning the question of standing before one or
the other tribunal have been used interchangeably in resolving questions of standing to
intervene. Except for the adjustments necessary for assuring the manageability of ad-
ministrative proceedings, the criteria for standing for review of agency action appear
to assimilate the criteria for standing to intervene." Id. at 732-33. Accord, Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000 n.8 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (quoted at note 38 supra). In reaching this conclusion, the court took note
of the "seemingly contrary viewpoint" that standing to seek judicial review is a dif-
ferent question from right to intervene (see 3 K. DAvso AM.NI.isr'rsTViE LAw Trits
§ 22.08, at 241 (1958)), but apparently rejected this contention in large part.
It should be noted that literal application of the Data Processing tests to intervention
questions would mean that the agencies could not distinguish between groups and
individuals, since the "injury in fact" and "zone of interests" formulations provide no
logical basis for such a distinction. The D.C. Circuit seems to have adopted this rationale.
See, e.g., Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556, 558 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But cf. Martin.Trigona
v. FCC, 432 F.2d 682, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1970). On the other hand, a major part of the
rationale for allowing intervention in Church of Christ I is the usefulness of the
contribution that interveners can make to the proceeding. But it would be difficult to
draw a general distinction between individuals and groups on this basis. See, e.g.,
Yohalem v. WMATC, 436 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082
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Courts have also recognized certain situations in which public in-
terest group intervention is improper. For example, the D.C. Circuit
has indicated that an agency may refuse to consider an issue raised
by an intervener in a license renewal hearing if it has a pending
rulemaking proceeding on the same subject.43 Also, denial of inter-
vention in an adjudicatory proceeding has been upheld if the con-
tentions urged by the intervener are so lacking in relevance to the
facts of the adjudication that they should be presented in the form
of a petition for rulemaking. 44 The agency should also consider the
posture of named parties in the action, and whether their rights will
be prejudiced by a grant of leave to intervene. A private party that
finds itself in a position analogous to a criminal defendant 46 -for
example, a firm which is the object of an SEC action to revoke a
broker-dealer license--should be accorded more protection against
possible harassment by multiple interveners than a company which
is seeking a benefit such as a broadcasting license. The public interest
in speedy adjudication is greatest in the quasi-criminal case.
Agency response to these developments in the law of public interest
intervention has not been extensive, perhaps because they are rela-
tively recent and their full implications are far from clear. In addition,
many agency rules are phrased broadly enough to allow substantial
compliance with court decisions under existing regulations. 40 A few
agencies have revised their rules to permit greater public participa-
tion 47 or have indicated their willingness to grant intervention more
freely48 and to experiment with various forms of public intervention. 49
(D.C. Cir. 1968). Finally, several cases have concluded that, at least where the citizen's
group is a corporate entity, it may not have an interest sufficient to support standing
distinct from the interests of its individual members. See, e.g., Alameda Conservation
Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nont. Leslie Salt Co. v.
Alameda Conservation Ass'n, 402 U.S. 908 (1971); Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24
(9th Cir. 1970), affd, 40 U.S.L.W. 4397 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1972).
43. Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
44. Martin-Trigona v. FCC, 432 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
45. For a discussion of this analogy in the context of FTC adjudication, see American
Chinchilla Corp., 26 AD. L.2D. 284 (FTC 1970); FTC Statement of Policy, 35 Fed. Reg.
18,998 (1971) (appointment of counsel for indigent respondents).
46. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 302.14-.15 (CAB 1971); 16 C.F.R. § 3.14 (FTC 1971).
47. See 36 Fed. Reg. 1454-55 (1971) (revisions in rules of procedure for conformity
hearings by Social and Rehabilitation Service of HEW).
48. E.g., SUBCOMMi . ON ADMINIS. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF TIlE SENATE COMu. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 91Sr CONG., 1sT SEss., RESPONSES To QUESTIONNAIRE ON CITIZEN INVOLVENIENT
AND REsPONsIvE AcENCY DECISION-MAKING, 85-86 (Comm. Print 1969) (Response of the FPC):
The Commission has made a conscious effort to provide widespread notice to the
public about matters where public input would be useful or required. . .. Al-
though in the past we have not always permitted individual landowners to intervene
in cases where their land might be affected, we have recently permitted such
interventions and I believe we must find mechanisms which will permit a more
meaningful input by individual citizens.
49. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 27 AD. L.2D 877 (FTC 1970).
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Since the cases explicitly reserve to the agencies substantial discretion
to administer intervention5 0 agencies must devise methods to incor-
porate public participation while preserving the degree of control
required for their orderly operation.
II. Preliminary Issues in Structuring Intervention
A. Intervention and the Type of Hearing
Four broad categories of administrative hearings have been estab-
lished by the APA and other statutes-notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing, rulemaking-on-a-record, ratemaking, and adjudication. To a lim-
ited degree the format of an administrative hearing determines the
extent to which public participation is appropriate.
1. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is a quasi-legislative proceeding
in which an agency submits tentative rules for written and oral com-
ment. After these comments are received, the agency usually recon-
siders the tentative rules and issues a final version effective thirty days
after publication. The format of such proceedings is modeled on the
representative and political process of legislatures. A participant merely
presents his views; usually witnesses are not cross-examined, and dis-
covery is not allowed. The need for, and desirability of, public par-
ticipation in this procedure is axiomatic; the process is designed for
promulgating standards of broad applicability. This article will not
focus on public intervention in notice-and-comment rulemaking pro-
ceedings, however, since these proceedings have not been the source
of major problems in structuring intervention. Public interest groups
generally have been allowed to participate freely in notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking. The only serious question has been how to com-
municate notice of these proceedings to the public and their group
representatives. This does not mean that changes in rulemaking for-
mats could not make public participation more effective. For example,
where feasible, agencies should make available information and ma-
terials relied upon to formulate the proposed rule.
50. Compare Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC. 359
F.2d 994, 1005-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966). with National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch,
429 F.2d 725, 758-39 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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2. Rulemaking-on-a-Record
Unlike notice-and-comment rulemaking, rulemaking-on-a-record in-
variably involves some form of oral hearing, where evidence and
argument are received and the agency's decision must be based upon
and limited to the hearing record.51 Procedurally, they often resemble
adjudicatory hearings. A mere description of this type of hearing,
however, does not suggest the proper scope of public intervention.
Rulemaking-on-a-record is employed for a variety of purposes, rang-
ing from something similar to informal ("legislative") rulemaking
in which broad policy issues are involved and basic facts are undisputed
(e.g., food standards) ,52 to trial-type proceedings concerning relatively
narrow questions, where basic facts are often in dispute and the
decision will have a significant impact on a few named parties (e.g.,
setting minimum wage rates in the island possessions) .3 In the latter
case, the problems presented in establishing guidelines for public in-
tervention are similar to those raised by adjudicatory proceedings.
Thus, rather than being structured by broad guidelines appropriate
for all rulemaking-on-a-record, public participation would seem to
depend on such functional factors as the issues involved and the num-
ber of parties, as well as the hearing format (i.e., the manner in which
evidence is received).
3. Ratemaking
The setting of rates to be charged by a regulated business contains
elements of both adjudication and rulemaking. Although ratemaking,
like rulemaking, is of "future effect," it is bised primarily upon the
proof of past "adjudicative" facts, and usually has "particular" rather
than "general" applicability54 Consequently, ratemaking proceedings
are usually trial-type hearings where testimony is sworn and subject
to cross-examination and the resultant order has an impact on named
parties. It seems clear that public participants can contribute to rate-
making decisions, primarily on broad policy issues such as the distribu-
tion of charges among affected segments of the public and the quality
51. See generally Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record, REPORT FOR TilE Co.tMMrr=
ON RULEMAKING, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. (Sept. 23, 1971).
52. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (1970).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
54. Compare Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908), with Morgan
v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1936); see I K.C. DAvIs, ADMINXsraATIVE LAW TREArIsE
§ 5.01 n.1 (1958). The Administrative Procedure Act considers ratemaking to be rule-
making. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
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of service rendered by the utility. The only serious questions involve
the extent of public participation. Since the functional criteria sug-
gested for determining participation in other adjudicatory hearings
seem fully applicable to ratemaking, they need not be considered
separately.
4. Adjudications
Administrative agencies frequently rely on trial-type hearings for
deciding disputed questions of fact and for ordering compliance by
named parties with specific laws and regulations. Generally the parties
are represented by counsel, the trial examiner is treated with deference,
evidence is received in question and answer form, and it is subject
to cross-examination and rebuttal. Despite the overall similarity to
judicial trials, the rules of intervention in judicial proceedings provide
scant guidance. 5 As with rulemaking-on-a-record and ratemaking, a
mere description of the format of adjudicatory hearings does not sug-
gest methods of structuring intervention. For adjudications, too, are
employed in a number of different contexts, only some of which
would benefit from public interest group participation. For example,
when the adjudication is a complaint case involving only the applica-
tion of settled doctrine to a particular respondent-especially if a
penalty could be imposed-there seems to be very little for the inter-
vener to do outside of presenting an amicus brief or appearing as a
witness. Intervention by public groups as parties in such hearings
would subject the charged party to the prosecutorial resources not
only of the government but also of the intervener. On the other
hand, adjudications are often used by agencies as vehicles for formu-
lating new policies of broad applicability, and frequently have an
explicit or implicit resource allocation function affecting substantial
segments of the economy. In the area of adjudicative proceedings, then,
structuring intervention merely according to the category of the hear-
ing is seldom appropriate.
B. Determining Intervention by a Functional Analysis
This analysis suggests that except for notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing, determining whether public interest groups should be encour-
55. Rules regarding permissive intervention at trial proceedings are limited to broad,
general guidelines which permit substantial judicial discretion. See 3B J. Moor, FEDEPAL
PPAcrxcE 24.10, at 24-351 (2d ed. 1969).
The Yale Law Journal
aged to participate in administrative hearings should not depend upon
the hearing format. The other administrative hearings described above
tend in practice to vary between quasi-legislative proceedings at one
extreme and trial-type hearings at the other.
Public participation should be encouraged whenever the proceeding
is quasi-legislative in nature. Structuring public intervention in trial-
type hearings, on the other hand, appears to be a matter of weighing
the potential contribution of public interest group interveners against
the need for agencies to retain some control over their proceedings,
all in the context of highly particular situations. Whether public in-
tervention should be encouraged in trial-type hearings, therefore, re-
quires a functional analysis. But this need not mean that agencies
must (or should) resort to wholly ad hoc decisions regarding inter-
vention. Specific criteria useful in determining the appropriate scope
of public intervention can be developed. What follows is an attempt
to delineate guidelines for agencies to structure such intervention.
Whether or not one accepts the particular conclusions reached here,
reliance upon a functional analysis should provide a sound basis for
understanding and charting future developments in public interest
group intervention in administrative hearings.
III. Criteria for Structuring Intervention
The issues raised by public intervention in trial-type hearings
occur at two procedural stages. First, in determining whether a par-
ticular applicant should be allowed to intervene, and second, in de-
termining the scope or range of intervention allowed that applicant.
For convenience of analysis, these questions are discussed separately;
as a practical matter agencies usually consider them together, especially
since some of the considerations will overlap.
A. Selection of Interveners in Trial-Type Proceedings
Although a general "right" to intervene has been recognized by
courts and required of agencies, it is far from absolute. Administra-
tive expedience and fairness to other parties may require the denial
of intervention in a particular case. Thus, even where the propriety
of intervention is generally established, it is necessary to decide who
among potential interveners may exercise the "right."
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1. Judicial Control
In the recent crop of judicial decisions regarding public interest
intervention, the courts have given some indication as to who should
be permitted or denied access to agency proceedings. One of the
earliest decisions, and probably still the most significant on the issue
of selection, is Church of Christ.0 The four interveners were two
church groups (an office of the national denomination with a sub-
stantial membership in the station's prime service area and its Tougaloo
congregation) and two individual residents of the area (both of whom
were owners of television sets and active civic and civil rights leaders).
The interveners sought to represent ."all other television viewers in
the State of Mississippi." Addressing the question of which inter-
veners should be permitted to participate, the court first noted that
"[b]y process of elimination those 'consumers' willing to shoulder the
burdensome and costly processes of intervention . . are likely to be
the only ones 'having a sufficient interest' to challenge a renewal
application." 57 The court effectively relied on cost as an automatic
selection device, suggesting that, at least until the cost issue is satis-
factorily resolved, an agency should seldom interfere and select among
interveners. Beyond this cautionary signal to the agencies, the court
spelled out at length some suggestions for determining which inter-
veners, if any, should be accepted:
We recognize this will create problems for the [Federal Communi-
cations] Commission but it does not necessarily follow that "hosts"
of protestors must be granted standing to challenge a renewal ap-
plication or that the Commission need allow the administrative
processes to be obstructed or overwhelmed by captious or purely
obstructive protests. The Commission can avoid such results by
developing appropriate regulations by statutory rulemaking. Al-
56. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
57. Id. at 1005. The court returned to this theme, after suggesting several criteria
for selecting interveners, as follows:
The fears of regulatory agencies that their processes will be inundated by tepan-
sion of standing criteria are rarely borne out. Always a restraining factor is the
expense of participation in the administrative process, an economic reality which
will operate to limit the number of those who will seek participation; legal and
related expenses of administrative proceedings are such that even those with large
economic interests find the costs burdensome.
Id. at 1005. Professor Buxbaum has correctly noted that the delay and diversion of
agency resources is an "overkill argument"; "it can be met . ..by insisting upon high
threshold levels of allegation and disposing of dubious cases through appropnate sum-
mary techniques, and by evaluating the transactional and institutional context of the
specific activity against which the complaint is directed." Buxbaum, supra note 19, at
1123.
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though it denied Appellants standing, it employed ad hoc criteria
in determining that these Appellants were responsible spokesmen
for representative groups having significant roots in the listening
community. These criteria can afford a basis for developing for-
malized standards to regulate and limit public intervention to
spokesmen who can be helpful....
The responsible and representative groups eligible to intervene
cannot here be enumerated or categorized specifically; such com-
munity organizations as civic . . .and educational institutions
or associations might well be helpful to the Commission. These
groups are found in every community; they usually concern
themselves with a wide range of community problems and tend to
be representatives of broad as distinguished from narrow interests,
public as distinguished from private or commercial interests. 8
Scenic Hudson59 is another case where the court suggested standards
for selecting public interveners. There, an unincorporated association
consisting of several nonprofit "conservation" corporations was al-
lowed to intervene in a hydroelectric license hearing to assert the
public interest in "the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational
aspects of power development." The court held that "those who by
their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such
areas" were within the class of "aggrieved" parties under the FPC
Act.°0 The plaintiff was a particularly appropriate intervener. It was
expert in the field; the environmental interest was not otherwise
separately or effectively represented in the proceeding; and repre-
sentation of a common interest by one organization gave a voice to
each constituent group while limiting the number of interveners,
thereby expediting the administrative process. This approach was re-
cently approved by the D.C. Circuit. 61
Courts have also begun to stake out limits on the selection of inter-
veners. In Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. CAB, 2 two citizen groups sought
to intervene in a helicopter license case. Intervention was denied for
several reasons. The two groups, each representing similar interests
and viewpoints, vied for the right to intervene; the Department of
Transportation had already intervened to press the environmental
impact through testimony and exhibits; the petitioners were late in
seeking intervention; and the denial of intervention had little practical
58. Id. at 1005-06 (emphasis added).
59. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
60. Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
61. National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
62. 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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effect, since the petitioners did participate in the final prehearing
conference and were given the opportunity to present exhibits, cross-
examine witnesses and make oral arguments. Moreover, the court
noted that the CAB had promulgated prospective rules regulating
intervention, considering, inter alia:
(1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the statute to be
made a party of the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the property, financial or other interest of the petitioner; (3)
the effect of the order which may be entered in the proceeding
on petitioner's interest; (4) the availability of other means where-
by the petitioner's interest may be protected; (5) the extent to
which petitioner's interest will be represented by existing parties;
(6) the extent to which the petitioner's participation may reason-
ably be expected to assist in the development of a sound record;
and (7) the extent to which participation of the petitioner will
broaden the issue or delay the proceeding.
0 3
2. Agency Rules
As Palisades Citizens suggests, occasional guidance is provided by
agency rules regarding intervention. Even where the rules go no
further than noting that intervention is available, an additional gloss
may have developed, as has happened with the FTC. While the
organic act provides for intervention in adjudicative hearings "upon
good cause shown,"0 4 FTC rules merely state that intervention may
be permitted by the Commission or by an examiner in adjudicative
proceedings; the "good cause" test is not repeated. 5 And in the first
significant test of the FTC's rules by a public participant, the Com-
mission relied on these rules alone as a basis for allowing intervention
in a consent order proceeding. 0
Further interpretation of the FTC rules was provided in Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co.,67 in which the same citizens group, law students
operating under the acronym SOUP (Students Opposing Unfair Prac-
tices, Inc.), was allowed to intervene in an adjudicative proceeding
for the limited purpose of presenting evidence and argument on
63. 420 F.2d 188, 193, citing 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(b) (CAB 1968). Thee rules have not
been altered in the meantime. Id. (1971). The protective sleld which well.drafted
agency rules can supply in subsequent judicial tests of its denial of intervention is
another useful by-product of the CAB's rules. See San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326,
331 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
64. FTC Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
65. 16 C.F.R. § 3.14 (FTC 1971).
66. Campbell Soup Co., 26 AD. L.2D 1011 (FTC 1970).
67. 27 AD. L.2 877 (FTC 1970).
375
The Yale Law Journal
whether the remedy urged by the staff would adequately protect the
public. Noting that it was "beginning a delicate experiment, one
requiring caution and close observation," the agency emphasized that
in determining whether the public participants were appropriate par-
ties, it must be demonstrated that the interveners will "raise substantial
issues of law or fact which would not otherwise be properly raised
or argued," and that these issues "are of sufficient importance and
immediacy." As the FTC indicated, this latter phrase meant that
the added costs incurred by the intervention were not inconsistent
with the agency's allocation of its resources.08 While a precise formula
was not stated by the Commission, it concluded that several additional
factors should also be considered before intervention in adjudication
is approved: "the applicant's ability to contribute to the case; the
Commission's need for expedition in the handling of the case; and
the possible prejudice to the rights of the original parties if interven-
tion is allowed."09
3. Functional Criteria
Whether a particular group or individual should be permitted to
intervene as a party in an administrative trial depends upon the po-
tential contribution it can make to the proceeding and the adverse
consequence that may be involved. This suggests a particularistic,
functional approach to determine whether and to what extent inter-
vention by the petitioning party is appropriate.70
a. Nature of the Contested Issues. A useful line of inquiry centers
around the issues raised in the proceeding, rather than the roles and
interests of the participants. When a new remedy or policy of poten-
tially broad applicability is at issue, there are obvious advantages to
be gained in obtaining the broadest spectrum of public input, con-
sistent with considerations of manageability and orderliness in the
proceedings.
A more difficult situation, however, is one in which the prospective
intervener seeks to raise an issue that neither the staff nor the named
parties has any desire to litigate. If the issue is tangential to the main
68. Id. at 879-80 (emphasis in original).
69. Id. See also American General Ins. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,915 (Jones, Comin'r,
dissenting).
70. For a careful exploration of the functional approach, see the seminal article by
Professor David Shapiro of Harvard Law School. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Interven-
tion Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Shapiro]. See also Comment, 6 HARV. Civ. Ristrrs-Ctv. LiD. L. REV. 559 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as NWRO Comment].
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thrust of the proceedings and it would be burdensome to consider
in the existing procedural context, denial of intervention may be
proper. On the other hand, public participants may draw agency
attention to issues and interests which the agency is required by
statute to consider but which it fails to include within the compass
of the hearing. In Scenic Hudson7' and Calvert Cliffs',7 - for example,
conservationists forced power plant licensing agencies to consider the
environmental impact not othenvise accounted for in their decisions.
Interveners have also drawn agency attention to new techniques
for fulfilling their mandate and have emphasized the importance of
remedies in enforcement proceedings. Two FTC cases, Campbell
Soup 73 and Firestone,74 illustrate this point. In each the FTC had
charged a private party with false advertising. Neither involved a
departure from settled precedent. In one the respondent was charged
with having put clear marbles in the bottom of soup bowls pictured
in its ads, causing the soup to appear "heartier" than it was in fact;
the other asserted that respondent's claims of safe and effective tire
performance were untrue or unsubstantiated. Yet intervention was
allowed in each because the issue which the public group intervener
sought to contest-the appropriate remedy-was not settled by prior
decision. Though the Commission had previously asserted it had the
power to require corrective advertising as the intervener asked,7-
there had been no clarification of the circumstances in which such
an order would issue. The question needed exploration in a factual
setting, evidence and argument regarding the impact of deceptive
and corrective advertising was appropriate, and the public interveners
demonstrated a particular interest in the subject.
At times intervention by public groups supplements agency re-
sources. The FCC cannot constantly monitor the performance of
thousands of radio and television licensees; indeed, it is more accurate
to say that it almost never does. Listener groups, however, can monitor
licensee performance.7" The ICC staff likewise makes no effort to
71. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 854 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
72. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 29 An. L.2n 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
73. Campbell Soup Co., 26 AD. L.2o 1011 (FTC 1970).
74. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 27 AD. L.2D 877 (FTC 1970).
75. Cf. Comment, Corrective Advertising: The FTC's New Formula For Effective
Relief, 50 TxAs L. REv. 312 (1972); Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal
Trade Commission, 85 HARv. L. REv. 477 (1971); Note, Corrective Advertising and the
FTC: No, Virginia, Wonder Bread Doesn't Help Build Strong Bodies Twelve Ways, 70
MlcH. L. Rv. 374 (1971).
76. At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, December 6-7, 1971, Mr. Max Paglin, FCC Special Assistant for Administrative
Procedure, reported that listener groups were currently intervening or seeking to inter-
vene (and thereby requesting a formal hearing) in eighty-three broadcast license renewals.
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question commodity rates, relying instead upon disadvantaged shippers
to assert the consumer's interest. When the shippers can simply pass
on increased costs, however, that protection fails and public interest
representatives can perform a valuable service31
An inquiry into the nature of the contested issues will not always
lead to an allowance of intervention. For example, in two recent FCC
proceedings, a renewal hearing and a revocation petition, 8 interven-
tion was denied. In each the intervener sought to raise questions
about the antitrust implications of FCC licensing policy. Each case
was appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which had opened the door for
public participants in administrative hearings in Church of Christ.
The court held that it was not necessary to consider the antitrust
issue in the manner urged, because the issue was "more appropriate
for exploration and resolution in rulemaking than in adjudication."10
The policy questions raised by the interveners applied to the entire
communications industry and not just to one unit.80
This rationale for denying intervention in an adjudication obviously
ought not to be invoked too freely, since a rebuffed intervener has
scant leverage to compel the agency to consider-the issue he is arguing
in a rulemaking proceeding, if one has not already begun.8 ' The
failure of many agencies to rely upon informal rulemaking proceed-
ings rather than trial-type hearings to decide general policies is itself
a significant cause for public intervention in trial-type proceedings.
There are good reasons for the broad discretion accorded agencies
to choose between rulemaking and adjudication in situations where
either procedure is arguably proper.8 2 Nevertheless, when it appears
that substantial numbers of public interest groups will seek to par-
77. Vegetable & Melons Transcontinental Eastbound, 335 I.C.C. 798 (1970), discussed
in Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REv. 1069, 1098.99 (1971).
78. Martin-Trigona v. FCC, 432 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d
556 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Cf. Pikes Peak Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 422 F2d 671, 680.81 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 979 (1969).
79. Martin-Trigona v. FCC, 452 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
80. Perhaps most significant (and decisive for one member of the court) was the fact
that the FCC was already pursuing this very question in actual investigations looking
toward rulemaking as well as in current rulemaking proceedings. 22 F.C.C.2d 306, 35
Fed. Reg. 5948 (1970); 16 F.C.C.2d 436, 34 Fed. Reg. 2151 (1969); see Hale v. FCC, 425
F.2d 556, 560-66 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
For another illustration of how the nature of the issue may determine the appropri.
ateness of intervention, see Buxbaum, supra note 19, at 1138-.39.
81. But cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
82. E.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Regular
Common Carrier Conference v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1969). For a
perceptive and literate analysis of this issue, see Robinson, The Making of ddnis-
trative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Pro-
cedure Reform, 188 U. PA. L. REy. 485 (1970).
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ticipate in an adjudicative proceeding or when there are a multiplicity
of petitions to intervene filed during the early stages of an adjudica-
tion, it would be sound policy for the agency to consider converting
the adjudication into rulemaking.
In examining the nature of the contested issue, one must penetrate
beyond a mere description of the proceeding and consider the nature
of the underlying dispute. Though all license renewal, suspension, or
revocation proceedings are similar in that they are contests between
the agency and the respondent, the impact of the agency's decision
on the public varies, and the differences may be critical. For example,
license revocations before the SEC (broker-dealer disciplinary hear-
ings) seem less appropriate than FCC license revocations for public
intervention. The difference is that the SEC's regulatory scheme
is not aimed primarily at limiting access to the industry; the public
has only a limited interest in whether a broker or dealer is barred
from further business because there is a broad choice among brokers
and dealers. By contrast, an FCC licensee holds one of a quite lim-
ited number of franchises, and the public has a much stronger interest
in whether the licensee's derelictions are met by mere admonishment,
a stringent penalty, or the transfer of the franchise.
b. Intervener's Interest in the Outcome. As Professor Shapiro ac-
curately observed, "[a]t the heart of almost every intervention case is
the nature and extent of the applicant's interest in the proceeding."
8 13
The intervener's interest is significant both in determining whether
exclusion is unfair to the intervener (i.e., to the public interest it
represents) and whether the intervener is likely to have a separate
and distinct position, to present, thereby making a significant contri-
bution to the hearing. To some extent, of course, the latter question
may be circular, since the intervener's position may be relevant only
to an issue which it is seeking to add to the proceeding. In this case,
the threshold question is the propriety of entertaining the issue at all.
But evaluation of the petitioner's interest in the outcome will not
always be so difficult. The welfare intervener in state welfare con-
formity hearings, for example, has a clear and direct interest in com-
pliance 8 4athe welfare recipient's interest is so critical, in fact, that
it has been suggested "that procedural fairness requires an effective
opportunity to be heard prior to governmental interference with
83. Shapiro, supra note 70. at 729; see 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(b) (1971) (CAB rule on inter-
vention quoted at pp. 374-75 supra).
84. See National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, .429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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financial interests which go to the core of sustenance."8s Similar ar-
guments may be made with respect to the interest of listener groups
in broadcast licensing.
The welfare recipient's viewpoint is also important because it is
likely to be distinct from that of the state or of HEW, and in reaching
a sound decision these views should not be ignored. Listeners likewise
can make a distinct contribution in FCC hearings, especially when
it is remembered that the purpose of government regulation is to
benefit the listening public. Conservationists are well qualified to
comment on aspects of the environmental impact of power plant
locations. When the prospective intervener is a de facto charging party,
such as a labor union in an NLRB case involving an unfair labor
practice charge against an employer,"' there are obviously stronger
arguments in favor of permitting intervention than there are in situ-
ations where the group seeking to participate represents an interest
which is difficult to distinguish from that of the general public. In
general, the public intervener's interest criterion serves to identify
not only the contribution which the intervener can make to the ad-
ministrative hearing, but also the right of those who will be signifi-
cantly affected by an agency's decision (even though the immediate,
direct impact may not be significant or distinct) to be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard. 7
c. Adequacy of Representation of Intervener's Interests by Existing
Parties. The crux of public interest group intervention is not whether
the intervener's interest is adverse to that of existing parties, but
whether its legitimate interests are otherwise represented adequately
in the hearing. If they are, the intervener should be encouraged to
assist the existing parties; to allow intervention in this situation may
be wasteful, duplicative and unnecessarily burdensome on the hearing
85. NWRO Comment, supra note 70, at 570.
86. See, e.g., UAW Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965); Solien v. Miscellaneous
Drivers & Helpers Union Local 610, 28 AD. L.2D 449 (8th Cir. 1971). But cf. Terminal
Freight Cooperative Ass'n v. NLRB, 29 AD. L.21 280 (3d Cir. 1971).
87. In regard to the opportunity to be heard, the right of public intervention is part
of a continuous development established in a constitutional framework in Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
It is, of course, somewhat anomalous to rely upon the intervener's precise interest in
the outcome as a basis for selection when public representation in agency proceedings
was most significantly expanded on the "private attorney general" theory and the
intervener's interest was only an incidental touchstone. However, the criterion of the
intervener's interest in the outcome looks not to the right to intervene (it now being
)eyond question in many administrative proceedings that public interest participation
is generally desirable), but to whether this intervener is likely to make a substantial
contribution to the proceeding.
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process.88 As noted earlier, it is not persuasive for agency staffs to
argue that their presence in a proceeding assures representation of
the public interest. Since the public interest is multi-faceted, separate
representation of identifiable views will promote an awareness of the
complexities of an issue and its potential impact. Public intervention
softens the artificial two-sidedness which is often a by-product of the
adversarial adjudicative process. Furthermore, it is not always clear
that the staff and public interest positions exactly coincide. It is fre-
quently asserted, and sometimes acknowledged, that agencies are "cap-
tured" by the interests they regulate.8 9 In other situations, such as
welfare conformity hearings, the interests of the so-called adverse
parties may coincide, to the detriment of the intended beneficiaries
of the legislation. And, on occasion, even the competence and good
faith of government representation have been authoritatively ques-
tioned.9 1
A related argument frequently raised against public intervention
is that to permit citizen groups to intervene when the public is repre-
sented by government prosecutors is an anomaly forcing agencies to
reallocate resources. Congress has delegated this decision to the agen-
cies and not to meddlesome interlopers, however pure their motives.
In addition, if the adjudication is a complaint case, intervention de-
prives the prosecutor of control of the case. The argument is a weak
one, however. Intervention does not replace government discretion
as to whether or not to prosecute, and once an action is begun the
agency's resource commitment has already been made.02 Nor is dele-
gation of prosecutorial discretion to the agency inconsistent with a
supplementary right of public intervention. As the initiator of the
88. See, e.g., San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
89. E.g., L. KOHLMEER, THE REcULATORS 69-82 (1969).
90. Though recipients' interests theoretically cannot be adverse to both the state
and HEW on a particular issue, adversity arises out of practical realities of welfare
administration. The state has an economic interest adverse to recipients when it
must increase expenditures on public assistance to achieve conformity. HEW, through
its matching grant system, must also allocate more funds to a state coming into
conformity. Both the state and HEW respond to popular sentiment against rising
welfare costs. Furthermore, recent administrations have found it advantageous to
maintain a cooperative relationship with the states to facilitate the free flow of
information between federal and state officials. This interlocking bureaucracy en-
courages HEW to identify its interests with the states rather than with recipients.
NWRO Comment, supra note 70, at 572-73 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Trbovid v. United
Mine Workers, 92 S. Ct. 630, 636-37 (1972) (intervention in court action under Landrum-
Griffin Act by union member approved, because member's interest and Secretary of
Labor's advancement of "public interest" not identical); Cleveland v. Cities Service Oil
Co., 47 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (reluctant plaintiff an inadequate representative).
91. Cf. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 US. 129 (1967.
92. Shapiro, supra note 70, at 746.
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proceeding, the prosecutorial staff will retain primary control of the
manner in which the case is tried. Even when accorded full party
status, the intervener may not interfere with the prosecution of the
case nor may it burden the proceeding with redundant or irrelevant
evidence.
d. Ability of Intervener to Represent Its Interests. Unless the public
participant can represent its interest adequately, intervention will not
be maximally productive. Thus, listeners seeking to participaie in
an FCC license hearing must be "responsible" and "representative"
spokesmen.9 3 Invocation of this criterion does not suggest that only or-
ganized groups can adequately represent the public's interest, although,
where a choice of public interveners exists, an agency should select
those best able to advance their views. Caution should surround the
exercise of this selection, lest an agency be charged with having abused
its discretion by effectively denying the right to intervene.
Use of this criterion also does not necessarily suggest that only one
public intervener should be allowed, even if several applicants seek
to promote the same view. The intensity and concern of several in-
terveners may be cumulatively valuable, especially if the cost to the
agency's proceedings is comparatively slight.
To the extent that agencies become able to assist public interveners
and enhance the effectiveness of their participation, it will become
less important to scrutinize the intervener's ability to represent its
interests. Recommendations aimed at providing such assistance are
outlined below. But until these or similar steps are taken, and per-
haps even then, agencies should consider the intervener's ability to
finance effective participation, as well as the nature and uniqueness
of the evidence and arguments it seeks to submit.
e. Effect of Intervention on Agency Proceeding. In evaluating the
merits of a proposed intervention, agencies must be cognizant of the
net effect of their decision. The significance of the case, its impact
on the public, and the effect of intervention on agency resources are
all factors to be considered. In some instances intervention may be
inappropriate. For example, there may be sound tactical reasons for
postponing intervention until a better case arises. Intervention may
result in extensive delay when it is important that an issue be decided
quickly. Another valid consideration might be whether the public
93. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F2d 994,
1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Whether the intervener in broadcast licensing hearings must be
a member of the listening audience (i.e., a resident of the station's prime area) is less
clear.
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participant is seeking to initiate a proceeding, or is simply trying to
take part in one already in progress.
04
Although agencies must be accorded some leeway to take account
of costs, this criterion should not become a self-justifying means for
routinely denying intervention. Intervention may be costly, as the
administration of justice always is. Although the evidence for a so-
phisticated cost-benefit analysis is unavailable, the courts have al-
ready decided that in many contexts intervention is in the public
interest. In those situations, cost considerations should be subordinate
to the adequate representation of conflicting viewpoints.
Agencies should also take care in assigning particular costs to inter-
vention. For example, when agency proceedings in the past have been
substantially extended or have become more costly as a result of
intervention, it has frequently been because interveners have raised
new issues which the agency is required to consider but previously
had failed to examine. Utility plant site proceedings now require
additional hearing time to consider environmental impact. Yet this
cost cannot be legitimately charged as a drawback of public interest
group participation, since a prior judgment has been made that con-
sideration of that issue is essential to successful performance of the
agency's mandate.95
B. Scope of Participation
Determining the extent to which public interveners should partici-
pate in trial-type proceedings presents peculiar problems."" The right
to intervene is conditioned not solely on the direct impact of the
agency's decision on the public intervener, as is generally the case for
private interveners, but rather on what the public intervener cam
contribute to the administrative proceedings.07 Consequently, the
94. E.g., National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 739 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
95. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 3 BNA EviL. REP. C mQs
1232, 1245 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding FPC's license for construction of Storm King project):
We do not consider that the five years of additional investigation which followed
our remand [in 354 F.2d 608] were spent in vain. The petitioners performed a
valuable service ... . By reason of their efforts the Commission has reevaluated the
entire Cornwall project. The modifications in the project reflect a heightened aware-
ness of the conflict between utilitarian and aesthetic needs.
96. This discussion concentrates on trial-type proceedings because notice.and.comment
rulemaking presents no significant problems of scope of participation. They are usually
one-appearance affairs, and the question is only one of fairness in allowing all par-
ticipants an equal opportunity to be heard.
97. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.
1965); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966); id., 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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participatory limits imposed on other interveners often have little
significance in determining the scope of public intervention.
A few general principles, however, can be set forth. Most are obvious
and seem indisputable. The agency must maintain control of each
trial proceeding to assure an expeditious conclusion. Observance of
rules of order are the sine qua non of a fair and full hearing. Each
agency must retain, and delegate to its hearing examiners, considerable
discretion to structure the public intervener's participation. Irrele-
vant, duplicative and repetitive evidence and argument can and should
be restricted. Common interests may be required to select a single
spokesman, and the agency must retain the right to determine pri-
orities and control the compass of the hearing.
1. Unlimited Participation
Contrary to the view of some agency staffs, hearing examiners and
commission members, public interveners in trial-type proceedings
should generally be accorded full participation with all the rights of
other parties, if they can make a serious showing of the need to partici-
pate in all aspects of the litigation. This conclusion rests on two founda-
tions, one practical, the other analytical. Practically, the cost of scruti-
nizing the scope of intervention is likely to exceed the potential risk of
full participation where it is sought. 90 Interveners are unlikely to delay
proceedings unduly or to increase their costs substantially, even where
they are allowed full participation as parties. The cost of participation
and the intervener's interest in an expedited resolution of the issue
make obstructionist tactics unlikely. In addition, where the public
intervener's right to participate is unfairly restricted, the agency in-
vites unnecessary appeals and expensive retrials.
The analytical foundation for full participation is that proper
application of the tests for selection of responsible and representative
public interveners should assure that the risks of delay or deflection
of the hearings from their proper focus are insubstantial. It would
be incongruous at best if an agency carefully applied the criteria for
selecting public interveners only to frustrate the objective of inter-
98. Reliance for proper control of the hearings and the orderly compilation of the
hearing record must, of course, be on the hearing examiner. He is fully authorized
to be the arbiter of the relevance of proffered testimony and of the proper scope
of cross-examination and to insist that all parties address themselves to tile business
at hand with dignity and dispatch.
National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 739 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
99. In fact, the cost of intervention either to existing parties or to the agencies is
unlikely to be significant unless the right and scope of participation is put in issue.
Cf. Campbell Soup Co., 26 AD. L.2D 1011, 1016-17 (FTC 1970) (Comm'r Elman, dissenting).
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vention by hampering the intervener's participation in the hearings.
Full participation with all the rights of a party to the proceeding
covers many possible areas. The right to appear by counsel obviously
is necessary if participation is to be effective and helpful to the agency.
There is no reason to bar an intervener from prehearing conferences;
in fact, such conferences may set the tone and determine the scope
of the proceeding. Even though a public intervener is frequently
allowed to participate because of its particular information or ex-
pertise, discovery may be necessary in order for it to protect its position
or complete its preparation. Expedition of the trial requires that the
intervener be as free to obtain admissions or fact stipulations as
any other party. Most important is the right to be heard by presenting
evidence, cross-examining witnesses, stating objections, and asserting
views through oral argument and written s
One possible exception to allowing public interveners unlimited
participation is in settlement negotiations. Informal negotiations might
be hampered by the participation of additional parties, and settlement
is a legitimate objective. The public intervener's interests would be
arguably protected in most situations by allowing the intervener to
study the result and comment upon any proposed settlement prior
to its acceptance by the examiner or the agency. Exclusion of an
intervener from settlement negotiations raises the possibility, how-
ever, that the agency and the other parties may freeze him out and
settle the case to his disadvantage. Public interveners could of course
challenge such settlements, and challenges should prompt scrutiny of
the settlement, including a hearing if any factual issue remains in
doubt. This procedure may be a fair resolution of the conflicting
interests of interveners, agency and existing parties in promoting
settlement, and is supported by agency and court precedent.' 0 '
100. In NIVRO, the court spelled out the intervener's rights as follows:
(a) To appear by counsel or other authorized representative, in all hearing proceedings.
(b) To participate in any prehearing conference held by the presiding officer.
(c) To enter into stipulation as to facts which will be made a part ot the record.
(d) To make opening statements at the hearing.
(e) To present relevant evidence on the issues at the hearing.
(f) To present witnesses.
(g) To cross-examine witnesses for other parties.
(h) To present oral arguments at the hearing.
(i) To submit written briefs, proposed findings of fact and proposed conclusions of
law, after the hearing.
NWRO v. Finch (Final Order Nov. 24, 1970), quoted in NWRO Comment, supra note
70, at 577 n.114.
101. Id. (paragraph 2 of Final Order); Campbell Soup Co., 26 AD. L.2o 1011 (FTC
1970). See also Letter from Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, to Representa-
tive Emanuel Celler, March 17, 1967, in BNA Ah'rrrusT & TRnAE REc. R aP., Mard 21,
1967, at X-1.
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In many situations, however, permitting intervention in settlement
negotiations does seem appropriate. Most private attorneys and agency
personnel with experience in the area of public intervention claim
that excluding interveners from the settlement process may ensure
an unacceptable result. The cost of the intervener's inclusion in settle-
ment negotiations, both to the agency and the parties, will usually be
no greater than the cost of intervention in the hearing itself. Public
interveners may also facilitate settlement, by being freer to suggest
compromises acceptable to the major protagonists. Given the possi-
bility that interveners may be prejudiced by settlements arrived at
without them, and the chance that they might expedite settlement
negotiations, it seems wisest for agencies to include all participants
in settlement procedures unless substantial reasons to the contrary
are demonstrated.
Further aspects of the scope of intervention include the initiation
of agency proceedings and the addition of issues by interveners. Tech-
nically, in most instances only the agency can initiate a trial pro-
ceeding.10 2 Any person or group may petition the agency and seek
to establish why an agency hearing is necessary,103 although partici-
pation by the petitioner is not assured if a hearing is granted.10"
"Intervention," then, is technically limited to participation in an
ongoing agency proceeding.
The line between intervention in and a petition for a hearing
becomes unclear, however, where the agency is required by a court
or its enabling statute or procedures to initiate a hearing on request
and to permit the petitioner to intervene. For example, the Com-
Munications Act requires that the FCC allow a licensee a "full [ad-
judicative] hearing" before an application for renewal is denied.10 o
Consequently, if a public interest group petitions the FCC to deny
a license renewal and presents supporting evidence, the agency may
be required to hold a hearing and allow the public group to inter-
vene.'00 Even if an agency is forced in this way to hold a hearing, the
question of whether a trial-type hearing is necessary is usually within
102. See Shapiro, supra note 70, at 726-29. But see L. JAFFE & N. NATIlANso,4, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 18 (3d ed. 1968) (ICC reparation procedures).
103. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(d), 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1970).
104. Cf. Campbell Soup Co., 26 AD. L.2D 1011 (FTC 1970). Denial of such a petition
may now be subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc, V.
Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
105. 47 U.S.C. §§ 308, 309(d) (1970); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.539, 1.580, 1.587, 1.591, 1.593 (FCC
1971); see Note, Standing to Protest Before the FCC, 55 COLUM. L. RaY. 209 (1955).
106. E.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); id. 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Church of Christ 11).
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the agency's discretion, so that it can establish priorities and control
its resources.' 0 7 The general rule of full participation does not impinge
on this discretion, but agencies must be prepared to explain why
proceedings or rules urged by public interest groups are not pressed.108
Similarly, public interveners may seek to broaden the issues or to
alter the focus of the proceeding, and here again the agency must be
allowed to exercise control.10 9 Unlimited participation by public in-
terveners in most cases where they seek full party status does not mean
that any issue raised by the intervener is appropriate for a full hearing.
If the issue is relevant to the case, if substantial doubt exists or the
facts are in dispute, and if it will not otherwise be canvassed, the issue
should be included. In general, however, interveners should not select
the issues or control the course of trial proceedings. The reason public
intervention is allowed and encouraged in agency proceedings is usu-
ally to explore issues already raised by the parties, but from a different
perspective. If this opportunity is overextended, the benefits of in-
tervention may no longer outweigh the costs.
2. Limited Participation
Intervention as a full party is not the only possibility, and it is not
uncommon for agencies to permit "interveners," with or without the
status of parties, to participate in trial hearings by submitting amicus
briefs, appearing as a witness, presenting evidence, or cross-examining
witnesses." a0 Public interveners will frequently be satisfied with one
of these alternatives, provided that limited participation does not
restrict the interveners' right to appeal. By specifying the oppor-
tunity for limited participation in their rules, agencies can encourage
public interveners to accept a more restricted-but not necessarily
less effective-role.
In order to keep the hearings manageable and fairly protect the
interests of existing parties, an agency in some instances may be
obliged to permit only limited intervention. The criteria suggested
for selection of interveners may be relevant in coming to this decision.
Where numerous parties seek to participate and some of their interests
107. See NLRB v. Wvyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
108. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1970). vacated
as moot, 92 S.Ct. 577 (1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
109. See generally Shapiro, supra note 70, at 754-55.
110. 14 C.F.R. § 302.14 (CAB 1971); 47 id. § 19.225 (FCC); see Boros, interention
in Civil Aeronautics Board Proceedings, 17 AD. L. REv. 5 (1964).
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are similar, consolidation of briefs and limitation of the right to
cross-examine may be appropriate."' Where the public intervener's
interest is limited to one aspect of the adjudication, e.g., the remedy,
the agency should consider limiting the intervener's participation to
that issue.11 2 Similar limitations seem desirable where the intervener
does not seek to controvert adjudicative facts-here, a written presen-
tation without cross-examination would be adequate.
One general caveat must be repeated, primarily because of the
latent hostility toward public intervention which occasionally surfaces
in agencies. In assessing the proper dimensions of public participation,
it is invariably asserted that "[t]he public would be ill-served by an
agency whose proceedings were vulnerable to disruption and agonizing
delay by means of the proliferation of parties and other partici-
pants." 13 The point is a valid one if kept in perspective. But as
suggested earlier, agencies should be extremely cautious in ascribing
much significance to potential delay or to harassment from public inter-
veners. Courts have been right to distrust the cries of impending dis-
aster. The available evidence, confirmed by the examination conducted
by the Administrative Conference's staff in support of this article,
suggests that public intervention has not impaired, and seems unlikely
to hinder, the efficiency or effectiveness of agency proceedings.' 14
IV. Eliminating Barriers to Effective Public Participation
Expansion of the "right" of public groups to intervene in adminis-
trative proceedings stems in part from a recognition by courts and
agencies of the public interveners' contribution to the administrative
process. "[T]hey serve as 'private attorney generals,' "115 and thereby
supplement agency resources."16 But standing to intervene is not auto-
111. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F2d 994,
1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
112. It is further ordered that the examiner be, and hereby is, directed to permit
SOUP to intervene for the limited purposes of:
1. presenting, at the conclusion of complaint counsel's case-in.chief, relevant,
material, and non-cumulative evidence on the issue of whether the proposed order
to cease and desist adequately protects the public interest;
2. presenting, with respect to said issue, briefs and oral argument in such manier
and to such an extent as the examiner may deem reasonable; and
3. exercising with respect to said issue, such discovery rights as the examiner
shall deem reasonable and necessary.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 27 AD. L.2D 877, 880 (FTC 1970).
113. Id. at 879.
114. See note 95 supra.
115. National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
116. Unless the Commission is to be given staff and resources to perform the
enormously complex and prohibitively expensive task of maintaining constant sur-
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matically translated into effective participation. Frequently the cost
of participation in an administrative proceeding mounts into tens of
thousands of dollars, and prolonged, multiple party proceedings cost
even more. Public interest groups are often financially unable to
participate. Some organized and established groups have been able
to finance participation by fund-raising, relying on foundations and
individual contributions. Ad hoc committees, pro bono publico ef-
forts of lawyers, and volunteered services of students and others are
occasionally relied upon to meet the cost of participation. But these
random, ad hoc sources of support obviously cannot meet the cost of
effective participation on a sustained and reliable basis.
A. Cost of Participation
Any method proposed to meet the cost of public interest group
participation in administrative trials is likely to be controversial.
Those who support intervention by self-sufficient public groups may
oppose governmental encouragement of intervention through various
subsidy programs, particularly if the cost of participation is relied
upon to reduce the number of "intermeddlers" and assure responsible
participation.
If the government is to subsidize public intervention, it may be
asked whether the further step of providing for specific, on-going
representation of certain public interests should not also be taken.
Perhaps it should. 1 7 But one need not go this far to argue that some
of the existing cost barriers are unnecessary and should be eliminated.
If public intervention is in fact a "right" which agencies have a
mandate to foster, failure to render some assistance amounts to a
practical subversion of that mandate. With the stakes so high, agencies
should pursue a variety of approaches which will reduce the cost of
participation and support effective intervention at a reasonable price.
Because experience in this area is limited, what follows is but an
initial examination of ways in which cost barriers can be reduced.
Four aspects of intervention have proved especially costly to public
veillance over every licensee, some mechanism must be developed so that the legii.
mate interests of listeners can be made a part of the record which the Commission
evaluates.
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 9-1, 1005
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (original emphasis).
117. 1 RECOMIENDATIONS & REPORTs OF TIlE ADMINLnmATIVE CONFERENCE OF TIlE U.S.
13, 71 (1970) (Recommendation 5: Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaking
of Direct Consequence to Them). See Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in Federal
Rulemaking, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 511 (1969).
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participants and constitute barriers to their participation: multiple
copy rules, high transcript charges, expert assistance charges, and
attorney fees.
1. Multiple Copy Requirements
Many agencies require the filing of multiple copies of all documents
submitted by parties. The FPC requires a total of fifteen "copies"; 118
the CAB requirement is twenty.119 Reliance on extensive written (di-
rect) testimony exchanged prior to the hearing, and on voluminous
exhibits which are frequently part of agency hearings, aggravates the
multiple copy burdens. When added to the additional burden of serv-
ing documents on -other parties, multiple copy rules present a substan-
tial obstacle to poorly financed potential interveners.
Some action has already been taken to meet this problem. In April
1971, the FCC reviewed its rules and reduced the number of copies
required for filing.120 Some agencies waive multiple copy rules when
petitioned by public groups claiming hardship. 121 The number of
copies parties are required to file should be reduced to a minimum;
flexibility might be allowed by permitting the hearing officer to deter-
mine how many copies are needed in a proceeding. Where even
reasonable and necessary requirements for the filing of multiple copies
work a hardship on public participants, agencies should be generous
in waiving these requirements. In addition, agencies should permit
use of their duplication facilities at minimum cost in order to assist
parties who lack access to such services.
2. Transcripts
Transcripts of administrative proceedings are prepared by private
reporting companies operating under annual contracts with the agen-
cies. Three classes of service varying in price and speed of delivery
are offered. In descending order of cost these classes are: "immediate"
or "rush" copy delivered on the same day as the hearing; "daily" ,copy
delivered on the morning after the hearing; and "ordinary" copy de-
livered five to ten days after the hearing.
118. 18 C.F.R. § 1.15(b) (FPC 1971) (original and fourteen copies).
119. 14 C.F.R. § 302.3 (CAB).
120. In re Reducing the Number of Copies of Pleadings Filed in Commission Pro.
ceedings, 28 F.C.C.2d 443 (1971).
121. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder], TRADE REc. RE'.
19,006, at 21,623 (FTC 1969); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 TmAE REG. REv'. 19,519,
at 21,575 (FTC 1971) (interlocutory order).
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The terms and prices of reporting services for the agency holding
the hearing, as well as for the public, vary greatly among agencies.12
The CAB, FCC and FPC receive their own copies of transcripts at
no charge, while the ICC pays a reduced rate for its copies. The FTC
and SEC pay for their copies but the charge per copy to them is less
than that charged other parties; the FTC receives several copies at a
total price only slightly in excess of the single copy charge to others.
The FDA and SRS, on the other hand, pay more for their copies of
the transcript than do other parties. All of these agencies make a copy
of the transcript available to the public as soon as it is received. Most
agencies do not permit reproduction of this copy, however, requiring
it to be used in place and only during the agency's business hours.
Although "rush" copy of transcripts may be desirable for cross-
examination or for consultation with co-counsel and advisers not
present at the hearing, the significant need for transcripts in most
cases is in preparing proposed findings, arguments and briefs. For
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this purpose "ordinary" copy is sufficient. But even at the "ordinary"
copy rate a complete transcript is expensive. An average hearing day
results in over 100 transcript pages, so that even relatively short pro-
ceedings taking only a week or two result in transcripts of 500 to 1,000
pages, costing hundreds of dollars. Rate cases in the FCC, FPC and
CAB, or contested licensing proceedings in the FCC and FPC, typi-
cally require lengthy hearings with thousands of pages of transcript
at a cost of several thousand dollars.
In a few instances, parties can avoid purchase of the transcript by
using the public copy. But this copy is only available to attorneys in
Washington, D.C. Furthermore, attorneys using it must work away
from their offices and only during the business hours of the agency. It is
consequently difficult for those who have access only to the public
copy of the transcript to use it effectively, and the quality of represen-
tation is likely to suffer.
The problem of transcript costs derives from the pricing structure
used by agencies in contracting with reporting companies. By obtain-
ing their own copy free or at a reduced rate, the agencies pass all or
part of their transcript costs onto the parties. The parties effectively
subsidize the cost of hearings which agencies are usually required by
law to conduct. 23
Although some agencies make provision for providing transcripts
to public participants at reduced rates or without charge,124 the most
sensible reform would seem to be a complete revision of the pricing
structure for transcripts. Preferential pricing systems are likely to
prove difficult to administer, and pressures will develop to include
private parties in the preferred categories. Furthermore, reporting
companies might raise prices to protect themselves because of actual
or potential loss of revenues.
There is an additional reason for insisting that agencies bear the
full cost of transcription. The agency usually initiates the hearing
and controls it, and it is the agency's responsibility to transcribe the
proceedings and maintain records. Transcription thus seems to be a
legitimate cost of government, and should be paid for out of general
revenues. If the added expense for the agency is burdensome, addi-
tional funds should be appropriated for this purpose. All other parties
123. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1970). The Administrative 'rocedure Act is neutral on
the allocation of transcript costs, however. APA § 7(d), 5 U.S.C. § 56(e) (1970) (transcript
available to parties "on payment of lawfully prescribed costs").
124. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co., 26 AD. L.2D 1011, 1016 (FTC 1970) (granting request
for free copy of transcript).
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to the proceeding, both public and private, should be able to purchase
a copy of the transcript prepared for the agency at a price based
solely on the cost of duplication.12
While this procedure might result in a substantial increase in the
price paid by the agency for transcripts, it would give the agency
greater control of the pricing system and would make transcript copy
available to nearly all participants. Where a party desires faster de-
livery than the agency requests or a fair hearing requires, the party
seeking expedited delivery should bear the extra cost. In the event
that an indigent party is unable to purchase transcript even at the
proposed minimal price, the agency should permit access to a copy
free of charge.
3. File Information and Experts
Obtaining the information and qualified assistance necessary to
support substantive arguments is one of the most difficult and expen-
sive aspects of public participation.1 2 0 File information is not identified
or readily available. Qualified experts able to provide this information
and to testify in a proceeding command large fees, which public
groups are frequently unable to pay. Even when they can afford to
pay, public groups find that experts are reluctant to testify against
the commercial interests which might employ their services on a more
frequent basis.
Many experts who are not so constrained are employed by govern-
ment agencies, yet are still unavailable to public participants. Fre-
quently the experts are not employed by the agency holding the
hearing. Even when they are so employed, agencies are reluctant to
make their experts available to parties for advice or testimony, be-
cause the experts' views might contradict the agencies' position, cre-
ating problems of supervision and morale. As a result, public partici-
pants have normally been short of expert testimony, operating with
only occasional private experts who share their concerns and are willing
to work without compensation.
195. This recommendation differs from that of the 1953 Interim Administrative
Conference which suggested that reporting service contracts "generally should require
the quotation of rates on the same basis to the Government as to others having an
interest in the proceedings"; it also approved "free copies, or copies at reduced rates,
to the Government when the proceedings are of such a character that as a matter of
general policy the cost of reporting and proceeding should be borne by the parties."
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON ADMINISTRAIVE PROCEDURE 42-43 (1953) (Recommenda-
tion 16).
126. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 TRADE REC. RaE. 19,519, at 21,575 (FTC
1971) (request that FTC pay fees of expert witnesses deferred pending ruling of Comp-
troller General).
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If the purpose of the administrative proceeding is to make a rational
decision after consideration of all relevant views and information, a
public group recognized as an intervener for the purpose of making
a contribution to this decision should have access to the government
information and experts. Problems of implementing that access are
not insurmountable. Agencies should engage in a sustained effort to
make file information more readily available by development of
usable data retrieval systems. Indices of file information need to be
expanded and also made available.127 While an agency's interest in
controlling its operations and personnel deserves protection, making
expert advisers and witnesses available upon request to public groups
may not interfere with that interest, especially when the experts are
not employees of the agency hearing the case. Institutional separation
is a hallmark of administrative adjudication. At the least, agencies
should be willing to experiment with this proposal.
4. Attorney Fees
Invariably, representation by legal counsel is the most expensive
aspect of participation in administrative proceedings. Estimates of
fees charged by attorneys in "typical" cases128 begin at $4,000 for
comparatively simple ICC tariff proceedings. Fees for formal rulemak-
ing proceedings at the FDA are estimated, conservatively, at $40,000.
Intervention in a major FTC proceeding might cost $100,000 or more
in fees. Major rate proceedings in the CAB, FCC or FPC and major
licensing contests in the FCC or FPC often generate fees in excess
of $100,000.
There is little likelihood that public interest groups can muster
resources of this magnitude, whether in cash or the equivalent in
volunteered services, without some sort of assistance. Although agencies
have very limited experience in methods of providing such assistance
to public groups, the needs are analogous to those being met by
various legal services programs both within and outside the adminis-
trative process. These programs suggest five different approaches for
providing representation: (1) encouraging pro bono publico work by
127. This suggestion parallels the index requirement of section 3 of the Adminis.
trative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970).
128. The rough cost estimates that follow are based upon Administrative Conference
staff interviews with informed persons, including agency staff members, public interest
lawyers, and private practitioners. Obviously, great variation in cost results from the
nature of the proceeding, its scope, the degree of participation, and similar factors.
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the bar; (2) awarding attorneys' fees and costs to successful inter-
veners; (3) appointing government attorneys to represent discrete
interests not separately represented; (4) developing a legal services
program for representing affected groups in administrative proceed-
ings; and (5) establishing new government entities, independent from
the agencies, as advocates of the various interests brought fonard by
public groups. These suggestions are not mutually exclusive, and our
experience is so limited that it would be useful to experiment with
each of the approaches.
a. Pro bono publico. Although public participants already have
sought pro bono publico representation on their own, government
agencies can play a role in encouraging and aiding bar associations to
organize and direct these efforts. The ABA Section on Individual
Rights and Responsibilities has suggested a number of different models
for such programs, ranging from special sections in each law firm to
multi-firm-operated offices, contributions to public interest firms, and
task forces from bar associations concentrating on specific areas of
interest. 2
9
The FTC, implementing its decision in American Chinchilla,30
secured the cooperation of the Antitrust Section of the ABA in pro-
viding pro bono representation for indigent respondents. Similar
programs might be developed to provide services to suitable public
groups.
b. Fee awards. A second approach to the cost problem is to permit
public groups to obtain awards of attorneys' fees. The device of
shifting the cost of attorneys' fees to the losing party is increasingly
favored in court cases as a means of assisting groups whose damage
award alone would be insufficient to justify an action to enforce their
legal rights. 31 Legislation establishing a new right of action often
allows recovery of attorneys' fees and costs as a means of encouraging
the protected class to enforce its rights.132 Courts have also emphasized
the value of fee shifting in situations where the absence of damages
129. ABA SECnoN ON INDIVIDUAL RicirTs AND REsroNsIatmEs, TlE PmivATE LAw Ftmt
AND "PRO BONO PUBLICO" PROcRA.S: A REs-'ON SiVE MERCER (1971). See Note. Struc-
turing the Public Service Efforts of Private Law Fins, 84 HARv. L. REV. 410 (1970).
130. American Chinchilla Corp., 26 AD. L.2D 284 (FTC 1969). See FTC Statenent of
Policy, 35 Fed. Reg. 18,998 (Dec. 15, 1971).
131. See, e.g., Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ulimate Burden Lie?, 20 NIAND.
L. REV. 1216 (1967).
132. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 2305(a), (c) (1970) (awards for unfair trade practices af-
fecting producers of agricultural products); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (treble damages, at-
torneys' fees, and other costs in private antitrust actions); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970)
(limited damages plus costs and attorneys' fees in truth-in-lnding actions).
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deters parties from litigating13 3 Similarly, intervention in adminis-
trative hearings could be encouraged by allowing public groups to
recover attorneys' fees and costs when their participation has made
a contribution to the decision. In regulated areas in which the number
of parties is limited and costs can be assessed without substantial dif-
ficulty, fees could be shifted to opposing parties. In areas in which
there are no private parties (for example, rulemaking-on-a-record
establishing standards having industry-wide applicability), public in-
terveners' attorney fees could be shifted to the government.
While offering the benefits that flow from representation by a
private attorney, such as free choice in selecting counsel, freedom
from governmeht control, and the attorney's obligation to represent
the interest of his client, this approach has several weaknesses. Admin-
istration of the program would be difficult. The agency would be
obliged to determine whether a group has made a contribution, an
especially difficult question in the event of settlement, and would
have to determine the amount to be paid. 34 Furthermore, it would
be difficult for the agency to insure that its decision on fees and costs
is not influenced by the extent to which it is in agreement with the
intervener's position. Aggressive attorneys who "rock the boat" or
who obtain judicial reversals of agency decisions might be disfavored
-and additional judicial appeals would probably follow. If judicial
review of an agency decision denying an award is limited to instances
of abuse of discretion, the agency may be able to convert its ability
to grant awards into an ability to regulate presentations. Courts have
dealt with similar problems, however, in supervising judicial fee-
shifting arrangements. For now it remains an empirical question
whether the advantages of helping public groups to secure represen-
tation from private attorneys would outweigh the disadvantage of
burdening the agency with control of the award.
133. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). The benefit to the class need not be
financial; nor need the case be fully adjudicated. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F,2d 161
(3d Cir. 1971).
Of course, from the standpoint of the public groups it makes little difference whether
their costs are paid for by the other parties to the proceeding or by the agency. Indeed
where agencies are self-sustaining because of user charges, the money for reimbursing
public groups will come from regulated interests and, ultimately, from consumers of
the regulated industries.
134. For a further discussion of this approach in the context of awarding attorney
fees in settlement of an FCC licensing dispute, see KCMC, Inc., 25 F.C.C.2d 603 (1970),
reversed and remanded sub nora. Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 1972). See also In re Letter to Combined
Communications Corp., FCC Docket 72-89, Feb. 9, 1972; Strauss Broadcasting Co., 31
F.C.C. 2d 550 (Aug. 26, 1971).
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One method of easing the agency's burden of fee control would
be to provide for payment of attorney fees in every case of need-on
the criminal defense model. This approach, however, would still raise
the question of denying awards on the basis of inadequate representa-
tion. Perhaps there should eventually be a presumption that fees and
costs will be awarded public interveners unless there is a showing of
inadequate representation. As a first step, however, their allowance
upon a showing by the interveners of a "substantial contribution"
seems desirable.
c. Intra-agency representation. Public group representation might
also be funded by having each agency appoint special counsel to rep-
resent the interests of public participants. Such an approach has con-
siderable merit, for it would assure separate representation of distinct
public interests. Problems may also develop under this method of
providing counsel, however. If public groups do not feel that the staff
of the agency is protecting their interests, they may be unlikely to
feel that a specially appointed staff of the agency will protect them'
either. Moreover, in some circumstances it may be difficult to insulate
the appointed counsel from agency pressure, since the agency would
be the source of his salary and promotion. Finally, it will be extremely
difficult to provide enough special counsel to meet the demands of
each "public interest," and if there is a shortage, selecting one group
over another would be difficult.
d. Legal services model. Another method for providing counsel to
public groups is to establish a program for administrative proceed-
ings on the model of legal services programs initiated by the Office
of Economic Opportunity. Attorneys would be representing the in-
terests of their clients, the public participants, and would be free
from control by the agency in whose proceedings they were partici-
pating. This approach requires a determination of which proceed-
ings will benefit from participation and which group or interest
should be represented when several groups seek assistance. The latter
question would be less difficult if several offices with separate special-
ties were available. Again the question is essentially one of priorities,
and the advantage of independence would be lost if the "public coun-
sel" retained no discretion. Of course controls would have to be es-
tablished, but this is hardly a novel requirement in publicly provided
legal service programs.
e. Independent advocate. Finally, public groups might be represent-
ed by an independent government advocate--a separate agency re-
The Yale Law Journal
sponsible for presenting the views of various segments of the public.
Although the advocate would be expected to maintain close contact
with public groups, it would not function as their attorney. Instead,
the independent advocate would develop its own positions based upon
an evaluation of public needs and views. The Department of Agricul-
ture, for example, has such a responsibility for representing the inter-
ests of farmers in administrative proceedings135 and the proposed Con-.
sumer Protection Agency' 36 would be given similar powers. Such pro-
grams permit various interests to receive organized and continuous
representation. They are more likely, however, to be subject to political
pressure and to lose the flexibility and integrity of less structured
methods.
B. Notice of Agency Proceedings
Even if public interest groups did not face significant cost hurdles,
their participation in administrative proceedings would be severely
handicapped by the general lack of effective notice to the public of
prospective agency hearings. Unless the public and representatives
of their interests are aware of agency proceedings, the right to inter-
vene is of limited value and cost reforms will be fruitless. On the other
hand, it is equally obvious that large, imprecisely defined groups can-
not be individually served by formal notice.
1. Agency Obligations
An agency's obligation to provide effective public notice rests upon
several grounds. To the extent that members of the public have rele-
vant information, enabling them to participate contributes to the
quality of the agency's decision. Public participation in the process of
decision making is appropriate to democratic institutions and impor-
tant for public support. It is also arguable that administrative agencies
whose actions have a significant impact on large numbers of the
public have a legal obligation to provide public notice for their formal
proceedings.137
135. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 16220) (1970).
136. H.R. 10835, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1177, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
137. See, e.g., National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 73(6,37
(D.C. Cir. 1970); American Communications Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 6418, 650.51
(2d Cir. 1962). See also Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5(a), (b), 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(b), (c)
(1970).
In addition, particularized notice is frequently required in agency proceedings. E.g.,
16 U.S.C. § 797(f) (1970) (FPC publication in local newspapers and notification of inter
ested government officials). Other statutes include a general requirement that notice be
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Whatever the basis, notice requirements are not satisfied by ob-
servance of mere formalities; notice procedures must be reasonably
adapted to the circumstances. 38 By statute, the Federal Register is
"reasonable notice" except when another statute provides othenise
or when notice by publication is "insufficient in law."'13 The Su-
preme Court has ruled in other contexts that notice by publication
is not always constitutionally adequate. It has stated the test to be
that publication alone is adequate in a civil suit only "where it is not
reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning."140
Whether this constitutional principle of reasonable notice requires
agencies to go beyond publication of notice in the Federal Register
is questionable. 1 41 Nonetheless, more adequate notice by supplemental
action is clearly desirable. That existing procedures conform to con-
stitutional minima is not a reason for agencies to fail to explore ap-
propriate procedures for providing effective notice to the affected
public and their representatives.
2. Meeting Public Notice Needs
The adequacy of notice to potential public participants should
meet at least two standards. First, agencies should be required to pro-
vide identified, accessible sources of information about proceedings
in which public participation is possible. Notice by some systematic
method of publication is likely to be effective, at least for those with
a continuing interest in the subject and with the ability and resources
to make the effort necessary to follow developments. Second, effective
notice to the general public and its representatives requires that pro-
ceedings of national or regional importance be highlighted for public
attention. Otherwise public participants can be drowned in a sea
of notice. The volume of federal administrative proceedings is so
substantial that unless sophisticated methods are employed, the prac-
given without specifying to whom, or that notice be given to "interested" parties, both
of which could be interpreted as including the affected public. See 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d)
(1970) (CAB, "after notice"); 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(e)(1), (3) (1970) (FDA. "due notice" of
hearing; order to be "made public"); 49 U.S.C. § 305(e) (1970) (ICC, interested parties);
15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970) (FPC, interested persons); 47 U.S.C. 9 309(b) (1970) (FPIC, public
notice of licensing applications). Cf. Murphy Motor Freight tint, Inc. v. United States.
148 F. Supp. 471 (D. Minn.). af'd per curiamn sub nor. Monson Dray Line, Inc. v.
Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 355 U.S. 11 (1957) (motor carrier competitors entitled
to notice of new applications because they were "interest d" parties under ICC Act)
(alternative grounds).
138. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
139. 44 U.S.C. §§ 1507-08 (1970). See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill. 332 U.S. 380
(1947). But see 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINasTRATiVE LAw TREATISE. ch. 17 (1958, Supp. 1970).
140. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 300, 317-18 (1950).
141. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
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tical impact of an improved notice procedure may be to decrease the
actual notice provided.
a. Convenient access. Agency publications and the Federal Register
are the usual government sources of information about the initiation
of proceedings. Their use varies between and within agencies. 142 Pub-
lication in the Federal Register is required for the initiation of most
rulemaking,143 but whether such publication is given for formal pro-
ceedings depends not only upon specific statutory requirements but
also on agency practices.' 44
While uniformity is not necessary, agencies should provide in rules
and publications a concise guide listing the sources of notice for their
proceedings; the guide should include sources that selectively highlight
major proceedings. Notable gaps exist in the published notice cur-
rently provided for in agency proceedings, particularly in applications
for rate changes.145 The volume of rate applications is so large that
government publication may be infeasible, but agencies could at least
indicate the extent to which published information is available from
other sources. Major applications should be separately identified.140
Agencies also need to coordinate their publications with the Federal
Register. These publications overlap frequently, and the latter is
unreadable and unusable except as a reference. Though it seems an
obviously sensible practice, few agencies consolidate into one entry
in the Federal Register similar material that varies only as to details.
Bulky materials which are of interest to specialized groups might be
142. For example: the ICC does not publicize applications; the CAB makes lists of
applications available only to subscribers, but these do not cover tariffs; the 1'TC issues
free press releases on every complaint, as well as a weekly calendar and a monthly sum-
mary of significant events; the FCC publishes a free weekly news digest including appli-
cations and duplicating many items in the Federal Register.
143. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
144. For specific statutes requiring Federal Register publication, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C.§
80a-39(a) (1970) (alternative notice under Investment Holding Company Act); 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(e) (FCC hearing issues in broadcast licensing); I C.F.R. app. B (1971). Agencies
have different practices regarding what they place in the Register; the CAB publishes
a notice of each hearing and prehearing conference in formal cases; the SEC does so
only when it is ordered in a particular proceeding. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.6(c) (SEC 1971).
The FTC publishes cease and desist orders and consent orders as rules (16 C.F.R. §
4.9(c)(3) (1971)); other agencies do not routinely publish orders. The ICC publishes
notices of motor carrier licensing applications, but not other types of applications; only
the publication of applications by intrastate carriers is required by law. 49 U.S.C. § 306
(1970).
145. For example, ICC notice provisions are in several unconnected parts of its pro.
cedural rules as well as in the application form rules. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1100.200..247, 1122.5,
1130.1(b), 1131.5(a)(3), 1306.6 (ICC 1971). The FTC does not indicate the coverage of
its press releases. See 16 id. § 4.9 (FTC).
146. The ICC, for instance, might consider listing publications of the carrier rate
bureaus, which function under agreements with the ICC in providing public notice.
The CAB has recently made its registry of significant tariff filings available for public
inspection, but its availability is not noted in the CAB's rules or publications.
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better published in agency newsletters or by private services.147 At a
minimum, each agency should (a) strive to provide notice as far in
advance of the proceeding as possible, and (b) prepare a separate
bulletin issued periodically, identifying the proceeding and providing
relevant information. 148 This measure would be particularly useful
to public interest groups located outside Washington, which are less
likely to learn of agency proceedings through informal contacts. It
also suggests that the primary function of the Federal Register should
be as an official reference and source of government regulations and
announcements, and as constructive notice. Agencies must look to
vehicles other than the Federal Register to provide effective public
notice.
The need to supply adequate public notice applies not only to those
proceedings for which hearings have already been scheduled, but is
equally great at the time the proceeding commences, i.e., when an
application for a license or rate increase is first filed with an agency.
Otherwise, public participation is likely to come too late to be ef-
fective.'
49
b. Attracting and focusing public attention. The public can be made
aware of important agency proceedings in many ways: press releases
directed to national and regional news media; requirements that ap-
plicants directly inform users; special notice to governmental bodies,
citizen groups or trade associations; and separate agency listings of
significant matters. Each agency should utilize these and similar meas-
ures to inform the public of significant applications and important
proceedings in which participation is appropriate.
147. 1 RECOMmENDATIONS & REPORTS OF TilE ADMINIS'RATIVE CONFERENCE OF TIlE U.S.
12, 66 (1970) (Recommendation No. 4, Consumer Bulletin) is not superseded or replaced
by this suggestion. The monthly consumer listing of informal rulemaking and legislative
matters issued by the Office of Consumer Affairs has drawn such a large readership
that it was recently announced that this service would no longer be available without
charge; however, the announced subscription charge was postponed by the wage-price
freeze.
148. Although beyond the scope of this report, a separate study of the Federal Reg-
ister and its operations as well as the publication practices of the various agencies seems
desirable. For example, ICC motor carrier applications, which occupied approximately
five per cent of the Federal Register in April 1971 (this month was picked because the
Conference's staff study of the ICC was written in 'May), might be separately published
by the ICC and only cross-referenced in the Federal Register. Fl*C consent orders also
needlessly fill the pages of the Federal Register. Consideration should be given to other
changes in the Federal Register which would emphasize significant proceedings. They
include: the addition of a regional index of licensing and other proceedings with a
major geographic impact; development of subsections-for example, grant and benefit
programs, procedural notices, general announcements; publication of a separate daily
and weekly topical index which would be sufficient for readers seeking to watcli for
developments but with only an occasional need to refer to tie full teXt.
149. Cf. Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. CAB, 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Coverage in the news media is perhaps the most effective way of
reaching the average citizen, and public interest groups and agencies
should make special efforts to encourage reporting of their activi-
ties.150 Factual press releases written in lay language should explain
the significance of the proceedings and the opportunities for public
participation. Releases describing important proceedings with a local
geographical impact should be sent to area news media. In major
matters, agencies might consider public service advertisements and
announcements over local broadcast facilities.' 5 ' Direct mailings are
yet another alternative.
User notice is already required in several agency proceedings: pro-
posed train discontinuances are posted on trains, and gas distributors
and utility purchasers often must be sent notice of applications to the
FPG proposing rate changes. 1 52 The FCC is considering rules which
would require announcement on television stations of license renewal
applications.'5 3 These notice procedures should be continued, along
with express invitations to public interest organizations. A similar
technique is already in use, where federal agencies are required to
notify state and local government agencies and labor organizations
of specified proceedings. Occasionally (usually in utility or trans-
portation rate or route matters), an agency will develop listings of
governmental agencies and private consumer groups to whom notices
of proceedings are sent. Agencies should expand this practice by de-
veloping mailing lists of organizations interested in major public
issues and providing them with notice. These organizations can assist
agencies in performing their notice function by informing their
constituents.
In summary, a variety of notice techniques should be relied upon
to publicize agency proceedings. Since there is a natural incentive for
150. Agencies have press information offices that issue releases, but these often are
primarily promotional enterprises and do not focus on important applications seeking
agency approval. In fact many of their practices seem objectionable. See Lemov, Ad.
ministrative Agency News Releases: Public Information Versus Private Injury, 37 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 63 (1968); Note, Disparaging Publicity by Federal Agencies, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 1512 (1967). See also Gellhorn, The Treatment of ConfidentialInformation by The
Federal Trade Commission: Pretrial Practices, 36 U. Cmt. L. REV. 113, 131-42 (1968).
151. The AEC has utilized such announcements in communities where nuclear plant
licensing hearings are held. See also Davis, Nuclear Facilities Licensing: Another View,
110 U. PA. L. REV. 371, 373-74 (1962); Murphy, Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards: Anl
Experiment in Administrative Decision Making on Safety Questions, 33 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 566 (1968).
152. 49 C.F.R. § 1122.5 (ICC 1971) (train discontinuances); 49 C.F.R. § 1306.6(e) (ICC
1971) (increases in passenger rates on suburban buses) ; 18 C.F.R. §§ 35.2(d), 154.16 (FPC
1971).
153. FCC Docket 19153, 36 Fed. Reg. 3902 (1971).
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agencies to limit public notice of agency proceedings by way of min-
imizing public participation, a deliberate effort needs to be made to
ensure that notice of agency hearings is not sacrificed to agency har-
mony and economy. 1 4
V. Conclusion
The demand for broadened public participation in governmental
decision making rests on the belief that government, like all other
institutions, rarely responds to interests not represented in its delib-
erations. An administrative agency is usually exposed only to the views
of its staff, whose position necessarily blends a number of discrete
public interests, and of private persons with a clear financial stake
in the proceeding. The emergence of individuals and groups willing
to assist administrative agencies in identifying interests deserving pro-
tection, in producing relevant evidence and argument suggesting ap-
propriate action, and in closing the gap between the agencies and their
ultimate constituents presents an opportunity to improve the admin-
istrative process.
Standing to intervene on behalf of the public interest has been
recognized. Concern must now shift toward structuring intervention.
Unless aided by other resources, the costs of maintaining an adequate
watch on agency developments and of purchasing competent legal serv-
ices and expert assistance will constitute insuperable barriers to ef-
fective participation. In addition, if public participation is to be
effective as an aid and not a hindrance to agency performance, sensible
and sensitive rules guiding that participation within reasonable chan-
nels must be developed by the agencies. The difficult questions, then,
are in what way and to what extent agencies should permit public
interest groups to participate in their hearings and what steps, if any,
society should take to support the efforts of those groups. This article
and its recommendations are only a first step toward answering those
questions.
The experience of the agencies over the. next several years in im-
154. One problem, for example, is that charges for information services provided by
an agency are by law usually paid into the US. Treasury as miscellaneous receipts rather
than being returned to the agency's budget to defray the costs of te service provided.
31 U.S.C. §§ 483a, 484 (1970). There are a few anomalous exceptions to this requirement.
31 US.C. § 488a (1970) ("Smokey Bear" receipts applied to lorest fire prevention cam-
paign); 7 U.S.C. § 2244 (1970) (Agriculture Department library authorized to retain re-
ceipts of book sales).
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plementing these recommendations should develop additional sug-
gestions. Methods developed by administrative agencies for structur-
ing public participation in their proceedings are likely to be instru-
mental in guiding other governmental institutions and, perhaps, in
encouraging other segments of society to allow an input by unrepre-
sented constituencies. 155 Agencies now have an opportunity to alter
the course of events beyond their immediate jurisdictions, because
the ideal of broadened public participation is not limited to the
administrative process.
155. See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON 8 R. WINTER, TiE UNIONS AND TilE CITIES 150.!53 (1971)
(suggesting the importance of including unrepresented groups in certain aspects of col-
lective bargaining by public employees).
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